Is cloud seeding a form of governance infrastructure? From one-off emergency responses to the rules and institutions that structure it

Who will decide when it rains next? Iran implemented cloud-seeding operations to address severe drought, in a year when precipitation was reported to be approximately 89% below the long-term average (Source: IRNA/BBC).

Weather modification is a public initiative in which governments try to control the weather to manage disasters and water resources. Cloud seeding involves dispersing fine particles into clouds to increase the likelihood of rain or snow.

Governance infrastructure denotes the framework—institutions, budgets, and standards—that supports these measures and integrates them into routine administration. Even when the same cloud-seeding technology is used, an ad hoc response and an institutionalized long-term operation differ in administrative status and evaluation criteria.

China’s weather modification: a decision-making process that foregrounds institutions, equipment, and budgets

In China, meteorological agencies and a four-tier system—state, province, city, county—oversee operations, and aviation safety standards, reagent-storage standards, and effectiveness evaluations are built into administrative procedures.

China plans to expand the operational area for artificial rain (and snow) to more than 5.5 million square kilometers by 2025 (Source: China Meteorological Administration/State Council). Weather modification services are deployed across multiple sectors—agriculture, ecological protection, disaster prevention, major event support, and air-pollution mitigation.

Effects are reported in terms of increased precipitation and reduced economic losses; for example, in agriculture and drought response, these figures form part of how operations are judged.

Results vary significantly depending on method and atmospheric conditions, and rigorous verification is difficult. In practice, estimates of added precipitation and avoided economic losses span wide ranges.

While institutions, budgets, and standards are increasingly fixed as infrastructure, the technology’s effects remain statistically uncertain; consequently, the program functions as an uncertain form of infrastructure.

UAE and Delhi: differences between routine operation and trials shape public reception

In the UAE, the National Center of Meteorology operates year-round with dedicated aircraft and a permanent setup, and links water shortage mitigation during non-emergency periods to routine water resource administration.

By contrast, Delhi employs a temporary experimental measure to reduce air pollution, costing about USD 70,000 per experiment, based on a report of approximately JPY 10 million (Source: Mainichi Shimbun).

In the UAE, the policy goal of stable water supply is foregrounded, making investment more readily accepted. In Delhi, the urgency of health risks and the fiscal burden become simultaneously visible, and because effectiveness depends on whether suitable clouds form, the measure has provoked mixed reactions.

Iran’s artificial rainfall and cross-border rules: the WMO assessment and the “rain theft” issue

At the technical level, the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) states that the effects of precipitation enhancement and hail suppression are highly uncertain, and that investment entails high risk.

At the level of political relations, Indian researchers warn that China’s large-scale plans could affect rainfall distribution, raising concerns about “rain theft.” At the level of international law, a general no-harm principle requires avoiding transboundary damage, but institutional constraints on weather modification remain weak.

On this factual basis, Iran’s adoption highlights drought conditions and urban water supply stabilization as the primary goals. Its immediate performance in evaluating the cloud-seeding effect remains unclear.

Even with this uncertainty, the case makes visible which indicators authorities may prioritize when deciding how to allocate or justify attempted rainfall enhancement toward particular regions.

If city governments, the central government, or meteorological agencies prioritize urban indicators in planning and operational decisions, rainfall in downstream agricultural areas and surrounding regions may be deprioritized.

Taken together, these cases raise issues about which indicators are used to measure and justify allocation, and about how those considerations are (or are not) brought into such decisions.

Both aspects shape the design of governance infrastructure around the practice. Cross-border impacts are especially salient in relation to China’s scale and its neighbors, where the no-harm principle is invoked but remains weakly operationalized.

China’s system appears more fully articulated as governance infrastructure; the UAE’s is integrated but narrower in scope, while—as far as current reporting indicates—Delhi and Iran remain more ad hoc or experimental, and have not yet been articulated into a governance infrastructure for cloud seeding comparable to China’s.